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INTRODUCTION

In May 2009, a bare majority of the Supreme Court of North Carolina decided State v. Rollins,' making a serious mistake in privilege law
that if applied generally will undermine the valued protections of evidentiary privileges. Ordinarily, few might criticize a ruling admitting
statements like those made by the defendant, Mickey Rollins, who indicated his guilt for a homicide. 2 However, Rollins' statements were
made to his wife, and under established precedent, those conversations should have been ruled a privileged marital communication.
The conversations were recorded by the defendant's wife for the
authorities during her visits with him in prison.3 Rollins was relying
on the confidence of the marital relationship in confiding his guilt to
* Professor Mosteller is the J. Dickson Phillips Distinguished Professor of Law at
the University of North Carolina School of Law; Professor Broun is the Henry Brandis
Professor of Law at the University of North Carolina School of Law. The authors wish
to thank Ed Imwinkelried, Jeff Powell, and Andy Taslitz for their very helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. State v. Rollins, 675 S.E.2d 334 (N.C. 2009).
2. Rollins was charged with murdering an elderly woman in her home. Id. at 335.
After his motions to exclude this and other statements were denied, he entered a plea
of guilty to homicide and was given a sentence of life without parole. However, Rollins
reserved the right under the plea to challenge the trial court's rulings, and an appeal
followed. Id. at 336; cf. infra note 9 (describing the independent basis for reversal in a
Fifth Amendment violation regarding a different statement).
3. Rollins, 675 S.E.2d at 335. The circumstances that led Rollins' wife to agree to
record her conversations with her husband are discussed below. See infra text accompanying notes 35-40.
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his wife. He was acknowledging his guilt of a past crime, not securing
help for a future one or enlisting his wife in justice-thwarting conduct.
He had secretly lost her support and was deluded in the confidence he
placed in her, but the marital privilege for confidential communica
tions protects communicating partners from that type of betrayal. On
all these dimensions, his statements were within the protections of the
privilege, and therefore the court erred in its conclusion to the
contrary. 4
With respect to one issue-required confidentiality-Rollins' state
ment was close to the line but inside it under prior precedent. Clearly,
Mickey Rollins had the subjective intent to keep the conversation
secret, but had he taken reasonable precautions to ensure no third
party overheard? In that effort, he had little margin to work with, for
he was talking to his wife in a public visiting area inside a prison. 5 But
he did what he could and his efforts proved effective. They spoke qui
etly, and he was not overheard by those around the couple.6
Had the majority simply ruled under these facts, that Mr. Rollins'
attempts to ensure confidentiality were insufficient, its narrow holding
would not have threatened the policies behind the marital communica
tions privilege. However, the majority did not rule narrowly. It did
not hold on a factual basis that the conversation lacked the requisite
confidentiality because Mr. Rollins was not sufficiently careful.7
4. For further discussion of the established law, see infra notes 43-52, 68 and
accompanying text.
5. See Rollins, 675 S.E.2d at 335.
6. Id. at 340 (Timmons-Goodson,]., dissenting).
7. The federal and state courts have decided numerous cases involving prisoners
using telephones, which as a matter of prison or jail policy and public notice are moni
tored and/or recorded. These cases provide examples of fact-based rulings that raise
no significant challenges to established privilege law because communications inter
cepted in the face of such notice lack confidentiality under ordinary privilege confi
dentiality principles. See, e.g., United States v. Madoch, 149 F.3d 596, 602 (7th Cir.
1998) (holding no marital privilege for telephone conversation recorded by the govern
ment while one member of the couple was incarcerated; the court affirming the deci
sion of the district judge who reasoned that given the likely monitoring "it is
unreasonable to intend such a communication to be confidential"); United States v.
Lentz, 419 F. Supp. 2d 820, 823-24, 827-28 (E.D. Va. 2005) (finding no attorney
client privilege for calls made on regular phones because "(t]he record convincingly
establishe[d] that during the period in question, all outgoing telephone calls from [the
jail] were recorded and subject to monitoring by jail officials and that [the defendant]
and his counsel knew this was so"); United States v. Pelullo, 5 F. Supp. 2d 285, 288-89
(D.N.j. 1998) (finding no attorney-client privilege in call made on regular prison tele
phone because the standard practice at federal prisons is to monitor and record calls,
and inmates are advised that calls are subject to monitoring with signs posted on each
telephone advising of the practice; the court also noting that as a highly sophisticated
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Instead, the majority ruled as a matter of law that, because the defen
dant lacked the ability to protect his privacy while in prison against the
government under the Fourth Amendment and therefore lacked a "rea
sonable expectation of privacy," he had no evidentiary privilege for
confidential marital communications. 8
Perhaps the court's mistake will prove minor in terms of outcomes
because even the majority that adopted it should easily recognize the
error in theory and find ways not to extend it. 9 However, as a matter of
prisoner, the defendant surely knew his calls were monitored and recorded); People v.
Santos, 102 Cal. Rptr. 678, 679-81 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (holding that conversation
monitored by a police officer conducted on a jail intercom telephone was not protected
by marital communications privilege because the parties realized at the time they
spoke that their conversations were being monitored); cf United States v. Griffin, 440
F.3d 1138, 1144-45 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding letter the defendant sent from prison to
his wife was not a protected confidential marital communication because state law
denies the right to communicate by mail confidentially with one's spouse); United
States v. Sababu, 891 F.2d 1308, 1329 (7th Cir. 1989) (recognizing that prisoners are
given notice of call monitoring and interception in multiple ways, including published
prison regulations and signs posted at eye level on each telephone that the calls are
subject to monitoring, and concluding that such notice defeats even a claim of a sub
jective expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment of a call recorded by fed
eral authorities). The litigation involving former Panama strong man Manuel Noriega,
although factually complex, is part of this body of law. See United States v. Noriega,
917 F.2d 1543, 1551 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding, on review of an ambiguous record,
that a release Noriega signed regarding calls on a telephone outside his cell raised
questions whether he waived his attorney-client privilege because the calls were not
reasonably expected to be confidential); United States v. Noriega, 764 F. Supp. 1480,
1485-88 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (describing, on remand, the notice of monitoring and record
ing on standard prison telephones-which would not be protected and which Noriega
used-and the alternative of a "properly placed telephone call to an attorney,"
although this protected alternative may not have been properly explained to Noriega
and therefore may have left his understanding of confidentiality ambiguous).
But in Rollins, none of the arguments just described supported the supreme
court's holding. The couple did not talk by external or internal telephone. Nothing
would have indicated to them that conversations in visiting areas were monitored or
recorded. Moreover, there was no evidence that the prisons even had a program for
monitoring or recording visiting room conversations. See infra sources and text
accompanying notes 35-40.
8. State v. Rollins, 675 S.E.2d 334, 340 (N.C. 2009). As discussed below, the
Second Circuit reached the different and we believe correct conclusion that the Fourth
Amendment's "reasonable expectation of privacy" inquiry and the confidentiality
determination under privilege law "are independent of each other." See United States
v. DeFonte, 441 F.3d 92, 94 (2d Cir. 2006); infra text accompanying notes 24-30.
9. Indeed, the decision of the Supreme Court of North Carolina that marital privi
lege did not bar admission of Rollins' statements to his wife did not even alter the
order for a new trial that the court of appeals initially entered. See State v. Rollins
(Rollins I), 658 S.E.2d 43, 52 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008). On remand, the court of appeals
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theoretical treatment of confidentiality within the area of evidentiary
privileges, Rollins represents an error that could undercut the protec
tion of conversations by married couples, lawyers and clients, patients
and their doctors, and penitents and clergy across the state that hereto
fore were understood by all to be protected. Cautious professionals
may change practices at the cost of efficiency and ordinary under
standings of confidentiality.
The "reasonable expectation of privacy" concept relied upon by
the majority is a Fourth Amendment concept and its application to
privilege law would both change outcomes in many and perhaps unin
tended ways, and engender confusion. 10 When using normal modern
modes of electronic communication, many of those communications
lack the "reasonable expectation of privacy" required for Fourth
Amendment protection. 11 If the confidentiality required for most priv
ileges disappears whenever we have no "reasonable expectation of pri
vacy" under the Fourth Amendment, our zone of protection under the
again ordered a new trial. See State v. Rollins (Rollins II), 682 S.E.2d 411,414 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2009). It did so because its initial decision had found a second error, the
admission of another statement by Rollins to a correctional officer in violation of the
defendant's Fifth Amendment rights. See id. The supreme court had not granted
review on that issue, and it therefore was unaffected by the reversal of exclusion of
Rollins' statement to his wife on privilege grounds. Id. In addition, Rollins had
objected to admission of his statement to his wife on the basis that it was involuntary
under the Due Process Clause, but the court of appeals had not reached that issue in
its initial opinion because it ruled the statement inadmissible on other grounds;
namely, marital privilege. See Rollins I, 658 S.E.2d at 51. After the supreme court
reversed the court of appeals' marital privilege holding,the latter had no choice but to
reach the due process issue, and ruled that Rollins was entitled to a new suppression
hearing because the trial judge had failed to make written conclusions of law on the
issue or provide any basis or rational for its holding, having stated only that the
motion was denied. See Rollins II, 682 S.E.2d 411, 414. The ultimate resolution of the
charges and the case depends on future developments.
10. In dissent, Justice Timmons-Goodson stated that the "reasonable expectation
of privacy" concept from the Fourth Amendment "need not be applied here and ser ves
only to muddy the already murky waters of our law of confidential communications."
Rollins, 675 S.E.2d at 341 (Timmons-Goodson,]., dissenting). We find her criticism
well taken but believe it understates the potential damage that importing Fourth
Amendment law to privileges would have upon its more flexible and generally reasona
ble treatment of confidential communications.
11. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the uncertain Fourth Amendment status of
much modern communication); see also Micah K. Story, Twenty-First Century Pillow
T alk: Applicability of the Marital Communications Privilege to Electronic Mail, 58 S.C. L.
REv. 275, 284-88, 293-96 (2006) (recognizing the limited protection that not only the
Fourth Amendment but also statutory law provides web-based e-mails but assuming
that confidentiality under privilege law can be determined differently and
independently).
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privileges will have suffered a major limitation that is not easily
rectified. 12
The reasonable protection of confidentiality, which is essential to
the marital confidential communications privilege and to other eviden
tiary privileges, and the Fourth Amendment's "reasonable expectation
of privacy" overlap in many circumstances, but they are distinct from
one another. To confuse the two is both to change the privilege law
and-we believe-to damage important interests in maintaining pri
vacy of intimate marital and professional communications in an
increasingly interconnected world.
In many states, including North Carolina, married couples have
two quite distinct privileges that protect them. One of these privileges
is unique among evidentiary privileges. It is the spousal immunity
privilege, 13 which allows a wife or husband who is married to the
defendant at the time of his or her criminal trial simply to decline to
testify against the spouse if called as a witness by the prosecution. 14
The privilege applies only to criminal cases, protects only couples who
are married at the time of the trial, and requires no confidentiality of
communications.
All three of these aspects differ from the other privilege, the mari
tal confidential communications privilege. The Rollins case did not
involve the spousal immunity privilege because the testifying spouse,
Mrs. Rollins, was quite willing to testify to the communications. The
12. Few courts or scholars have even suggested a way to mesh the ancient concepts
of the Fourth Amendment with the digital age. Professor Chris Slobogin provides one
of the rare alternative visions. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW
GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (2007) (arguing for a vastly
different system based largely on a balancing process that provides broad but limited
protection to privacy against various forms of government monitoring and uses
explicit polling regarding society's values); cf. DANIEL J. SowvE, THE DIGITAL PERSON:
TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2006) (reconceptualizing privacy
in the context of modern methods of data collection and storage).
13. No uniform name appears to exist for this privilege. The terminology we use is
descriptive of the privilege.
14. See generally 1 KENNETH S. BROUN, McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 66 (6th ed.
2006) [hereinafter McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE] (discussing this general privilege). In
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980), the United States Supreme Court
held that, as to the federal spousal immunity privilege, the testifying spouse controlled
whether he or she would waive the privilege and could do so by simply deciding to
testify. North Carolina reached the same result through judicial construction and by
statute. See State v. Freeman, 276 S.E.2d 450, 452-54 (N.C.1984) (adopting, in the
wake of Trammel, the position that spouses were competent to testify against each
other except as to confidential marital communications); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-57(b)
(2007) ("The spouse of the defendant shall be competent but not compellable to testify
for the State against the defendant ....").
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key difference with the privilege at issue in the case, the marital confi
dential communications privilege, is the confidentiality element of this
privilege.
The marital confidential communications privilege also differs in
who controls or "holds" the privilege. This privilege is designed to
encourage marital confidences and thereby support the institution of
marriage. Proceeding from its purpose to encourage confidential com
munications, the privilege, whether held exclusively by the communi
cating spouse or by both spouses, gives the communicating spouse the
right to refuse to testify about the statement and to prevent his or her
spouse from testifying regarding the confidential communications. 15
It similarly permits the communicating spouse to prevent his or her
marital partner from secretly betraying the relationship and revealing
or transmitting the confidential communication to others. 16 Thus,
under the facts of this case and settled law, Mr. Rollins had the right to
prevent his wife from testifying and to bar the introduction of the tape
recording she secretly made of the communications, provided they
were confidential communications within the meaning of the privilege.
In requiring confidentiality, the marital confidential communica
tions privilege shares a kinship with the other historically recognized
evidentiary privileges-attorney-client, doctor-patient, and clergy
penitent privileges. These privileges exist because courts and legisla
tures historically have recognized the societal benefit in protecting con
fidences in these relationships. They each require that the
communications protected must have been made confidentially, and
while the concepts may differ slightly at the margins, 17 the confidenti
ality concepts are broadly shared and largely consistent.
To understand the magnitude of the error in Rollins, one simply
needs to contemplate the potential impact of the decision's logic. The
majority in Rollins based its holding on its determination that a pris
oner has no expectation of privacy in a prison facility. Thus, it would
not have mattered whether the visiting area was empty except for the
married couple.
15. See 1 McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 14, § 83.
16. See id. § 82.
17. The marital confidential communications, attor ney-client, and doctor-patient
privileges may differ slightly between jurisdictions on whether family members can be
present without apparently destroying the privilege, and they also differ as to whether
obser vations made in private may be protected if not part of an explicit communica
tion. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 5:40, at 748-53 (3d ed. 2007) (discussing the differing deter minations on whether
to cover confidential obser vations, as opposed to communications and communicative
acts).
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Similarly, individuals (whether or not prisoners) do not have a
"reasonable expectation of privacy" in the parking lot of the correction
facility because they have no rights in this space; this outcome does
not depend on whether others are around or the lot is deserted and
isolated. Even if other wise empty (or if others are present but not
nearby), members of the public do not have a Fourth Amendment "rea
sonable expectation of privacy" in the waiting area of a train station,
outside a school administrator's office where they wait to discuss a
matter involving their children, or in a department of social ser vices'
waiting area or its offices. Even if married couples speak in inaudible
whispers, they simply have no constitutionally protected right under
the Fourth Amendment in such public space.
Again, the presence of others could destroy the "reasonable expec
tation," but their absence does not ensure it. Marital partners have no
expectation of privacy on a deserted beach or on a secluded path in
the midst of a wilderness park. Under the logic of Rollins, the conver
sation is not privileged in any of these places, even if the other spouse
is not recording it and even if that spouse is unwilling to cooperate
with authorities. 18
In addition, if "reasonable expectation of privacy" under the
Fourth Amendment is the test, then there is no privilege whenever the
witness spouse is willing to cooperate with authorities. This is true
even if the conversation takes place in the home. Under the Fourth
Amendment, there is no "reasonable expectation of privacy" when the
person who receives the communication is a cooperative witness. The
Fourth Amendment test would mean that conversations could always
be secured as long as done with the "connivance" of one of the
spouses. 19
18. In those states that have entirely abolished the spousal immunity privilege, see
Freeman, 276 S.E.2d at 453 n.l (observing that f o ur states had abolished the spousal
immunity privilege entirely), the witness spouse could be forced to testify against the
defendant because under the logic of Rollins the marital confidential communication
would be unavailable.
19. The marital partners would have no "reasonable expectation of privacy" in this
conversation under the Fourth Amendment for two reasons. First, the conversation
occurs in "an open field." See infra Part III.B.2. Second, the Fourth Amendment recog
nizes no expectation of privacy in any conversation to another individual if the other
party willingly discloses it to authorities under the doctrine of "misplaced confi
dences." See infra Part III.B.l. The Fourth Amendment's "reasonable expectation of
privacy" under this second concept is indeed incompatible with the marital privilege
regardless of where the conversation takes place, as long as the other party to the
conversation is willing to divulge it to the police. The Fourth Amendment protects the
martial home because it is a home, but it would not on its own protect a conversation
with another party, even if in the home, as long as that partner in the communication
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Moreover, the theory adopted in Rollins is not obviously limited to
the marital privilege and logically should apply to attorney-client, doc
tor-patient, and communicant-clergy privileges as well. The attorney
client privilege may receive protection in criminal cases from the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, but that protection has significant limita
tions20 and does not apply in civil cases. Most lawyers speak with
their clients face to face in space to which they have a relationship that
would allow a "reasonable expectation of privacy," but by no means
would all conversations be protected if the test for confidentiality
requires the Fourth Amendment standard to be satisfied.
Lawyers do occasionally speak with their clients over lunch in
public restaurants, albeit away from others, or at park benches isolated
from others, or in the unoccupied corner of a courthouse hallway just
before a hearing for last minute details. Occasionally, a person will
seek to consult a lawyer about a matter of concern at a chance encoun
ter at a social event and the lawyer takes the individual to the side or
into an unoccupied room nearby,21 or during an early morning
workout at a health club when machine noise or physical isolation
makes a private conversation possible. Some lawyers enjoy mixing
business with golf, discussing the confidences of the case on the fair
way or edge of the green or while on a hunting trip walking in apparent
isolation watching the dogs work the field. None of these situations
(as Ms. Rollins willingly did) divulges it to authorities. This Fourth Amendment and
the privilege concepts, like oil and water, are not normally expected to mix.
20. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is far from complete in criminal cases.
First, it applies only to cases where the defendant has been formally charged. See
Kirby v. Illinois,406 U.S. 682,689 (1972) (recognizing that the right to counsel com
mences only upon "the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings," which
occurs "by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or
arraignment"). Second, it is in a narrow sense charge-specific,only applying to those
specific offenses listed in the charging document. See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162,
174 (2001) (holding that the constitutional right was inapplicable to capital murder
charges even though those crimes were closely connected to the burglary during which
the murders occurred because,when the police questioned the defendant,he had been
formally charged only with burglary).
21. Unexpected conversations at social events that previously, with a few simple
precautions, could be covered by the attorney-client privilege may no longer enjoy
such protection. For example, if a person starts asking questions of a lawyer at a
friend's holiday party, the lawyer would be well advised not only to pull the person
aside to a private place but to find some space,such as perhaps her car parked outside
in which she has ownership interest, where the conversation can be held. Regardless
of how isolated one might be within a casual friend's house or at the neighborhood
holiday party, an attorney likely has no "reasonable expectation of privacy" in the
space absent a substantial relationship with the owner.
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permits a "reasonable expectation of privacy" under the Fourth
Amendment.
Even more problematic in potential significance are the uncertain
ties of Fourth Amendment protection of common modern forms of
communication by electronic means. Serious questions exist as to
whether telephone conversations in which either party uses a cordless
telephone are constitutionally protected. 22 The status of e-mail
messages left for another party and trash disposal, even with shred
ding, are either under a constitutional cloud or unprotected. 23 Under
the Fourth Amendment, it is uncertain that any of these communica22. See United States v. Mathis, 96 F.3d 1577, 1583-84 (11th Cir. 1996) (noting
that no federal statutory law protected interception of cordless telephone calls at the
time made and suggesting, perhaps, that the call thereby had no attorney-client
privilege).
23. We do not deal with how the government or the opponent obtains knowledge
of a conversation. Often "loose lips" give the other party a clue to what was said and/
or where it was said. If the party learns of a conversation and it is not protected by the
privilege, then disclosure may be forced by legal process and the revelation need not
be voluntary.
The clearest case for constitutionality occurs when informants, perhaps through
elaborate camouflage, secret themselves within hearing range of the conversation.
Acquisition of the conversation may be possible by innovative adversaries using tech
nology. For example, outdoor conversations may be amplified by parabolic micro
phones. See Gary T. Marx, Forget Big Brother and Big Corporation: What About the
Personal Uses of Surveillance Technology as Seen in Cases Such as Tom I Voire?, 2 J.
LEGAL TECH. RISK MGMT. 24 (2007) (discussing legal use of a parabolic microphone to
monitor distant conversations). Despite the recognition, in ominous terms, over forty
years ago of the threat to privacy from parabolic microphones, which can "pick up
conversations held in the open at distances of hundreds of feet [and] are available
commercially," Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 126 (1967) (White,]., dissenting), the
use of parabolic microphones to capture and record conversations in an "open field"
has not been recognized as a violation of the "reasonable expectation of privacy"
under the Fourth Amendment in any Supreme Court case, either directly or by impli
cation. Nevertheless, the interception of aural communications are much more care
fully regulated by statute and may run afoul of Title Ill's prohibitions, see 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-2522 (2006), despite lacking constitutional protection.
Interception of aural communication is subject to far greater scrutiny under the
Fourth Amendment and statutory law than is visual enhancement, which has largely
been unregulated if within reasonable ranges of publicly available technology. Thus,
interception of communications could be achieved without running afoul of any con
stitutional or statutory provision if the mouths of the speakers are visible using visual
enhancement and a trained lip reader. See David A. Sklansky, Back to the Future: Kyllo,
Katz, and Common Law, 72 Miss. L.j. 143, 204-05 (2002) (arguing that the Fourth
Amendment should regulate the use of a telescope to peer into the home or to read the
lips of someone talking in a telephone booth, but making no claim regarding observa
tions in "open fields"). For further discussion of related issues involved in modern
forms of communication, see infra Part IV.B.
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tions are protected by a "reasonable expectation of privacy," and cer
tain that many are not.
One cannot have such an expectation in a public building hallway
or "open fields" and cannot construct a reasonable expectation regard
less of how cautious one is. The space and the speaker's relationship
to it define the Fourth Amendment right, and prisons and courthouse
hallways do not differ in this regard. The concept of "open fields"
makes it impossible to protect a conversation in a park, in a parking lot
of a prison (or a shopping center), or a hunting reser ve (or golf
course). As to such places, fences and signs make no difference.
By contrast, privilege law has permitted individuals to create priv
ileges outside of space they own or control. Privilege permits pockets
of temporarily constructed confidentiality to follow the communica
tors as long as reasonably effective precautions are taken to provide
physical privacy. It does so because it depends on the similar, but
distinct, concept of reasonable expectation of confidentiality.
The majority of justices on the Supreme Court of North Carolina
missed the distinction between privilege and Fourth Amendment law.
Its holding, if not entirely unique, is highly unusual in American privi
lege law. It is a mistake as a matter of precedent and theory.
We believe that the Second Circuit, by contrast, employed the cor
rect analysis in United States v. DeFonte, in holding that the determina
tion of a "reasonable expectation of privacy" under the Fourth
Amendment and the confidentiality determination under privilege "are
independent of each other." 24 In that case, a witness for the prosecu
tion kept a journal recording conversations with her attorney about
incidents involving the defendant while she was incarcerated.25 The
journal was taken from her cell by prison officials.26 W hen the defen
dant asked for its production, the witness asserted that the attorney
client privilege protected entries that recounted her conversations with
her attorney and other material prepared for those conversations. 27
The district judge declared the attorney-client privilege claim invalid,
relying in part on the lack of Fourth Amendment protection for docu
ments of a prisoner.28 The Second Circuit vacated the order and
remanded the case,29 stating:
24.
25.
26.
27.

United States v. DeFonte, 441 F.3d 92, 94 (2d Cir. 2006).
Id. at 93-94.

Id.
Id. at 94.
28. Id.

29. See id. at 96.
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The district court's decision rested in part upon the conclusion that
"[the witness] cannot have intended her journal entries to remain con
fidential because the law affords her no reasonable expectation of pri
vacy in her cell." It is true that, in the Fourth Amendment context, the
law affords considerably less recognition to an inmate's subjective
expectation of privacy. An inmate does not, however, knowingly waive
an attorney-client privilege with respect to documents retained in her
cell simply because there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in
those documents for Fourth Amendment purposes. Rather, the two
inquiries are independent of each other. 30
I.

A.

THE DECISION IN STATE V. ROLLINS

The Facts

In 2005, Mickey Rollins entered a plea of guilty to the first degree
murder of an eighty-eight year old woman who had been killed in her
home three years earlier.31 Notwithstanding the marital confidential
communications privilege, the trial court (prior to Rollins' plea) admit
ted into evidence incriminating statements made by Rollins to his wife,
who had secretly recorded them. 32 Tolvi Rollins had worn a recording
device by agreement with a n agent for the State Bureau of
lnvestigation.33
Mr. Rollins had been seen on the day of the crime in the vicinity
of the residence where the victim was later found murdered, and he
became a "person of interest." 34 When first inter viewed, Mrs. Rollins
was unwilling to communicate with authorities, indicating she had no
pertinent information concerning the crime.35 When she was later
arrested for felony witness intimidation in connection with an unre
lated charge against her husband, she was again asked about the
crime. 36 Subsequent to her arrest, Mrs. Rollins contacted the police
and told them that Mr. Rollins had confessed to her that he committed
the murder. 37 She was informed a reward was being offered for infor
mation in the case. 38 She agreed to wear a recording device when visit
ing her husband in jail, which she did on three occasions in different
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 94 (citation omitted).
State v. Rollins, 675 S.E.2d 334, 335 (N.C. 2009).

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
38. Id.
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prison facilities.39 She was paid $840.00 for what were labeled
"expenses" she incurred during those visits.40
The recorded conversations occurred in the public visiting areas
of North Carolina Department of Correction facilities where Mr. Rol
lins was confined. 41 Rollins' plea agreement preserved his right to
appeal the trial court's ruling. 42
B.

The Court of Appeals' Decision and Analysis

On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, ruling
that the marital confidential communications privilege protected Rol
lins' statements. 43 The court held that this privilege could not be
waived through the unilateral action of the wife in revealing the com
munication by secretly recording the conversations with her husband
and disclosing them to authorities.44 Holding such unilateral action
ineffective to destroy the privilege is consistent with long-standing
North Carolina law, 45 which is generally in accord with the national
understanding46 of this privilege: one party to a confidential marital
communication cannot waive the privilege by disclosure of the com
munication, including the recording of the conversation.47
The court of appeals held that the communications were privi
leged despite being made in the public visiting area of the prison
because Mr. Rollins intended that the conversation be confidential48
and because, despite the public nature of the area, the parties
39. Id.
40. Id.

41. Id.

42. Id. at 335-36.
43. See State v. Rollins, 658 S.E.2d 43, 50-51 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).
44. Id. at 48.
45. See 1 KENNETH S. BROUN, BRANDIS &: BROUN ON NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE
§ 127, at 421 (6th ed. 2004) [hereinafter BRANDIS&: BROUN]. The text just cited notes
the existence of an earlier, contrary case that held that the privilege is of the witness
only and that the other spouse could not object. Id. (discussing Hagedorn v.
Hagedorn, 189 S.E. 507, 509 (N.C. 1937)). As those authors recognize, Hagedorn was
effectively overruled some thirty years later. See id. (describing Hicks v. Hicks, 155
S.E.2d 799, 802 (N.C. 1967)).
46. The nationally-recognized view is discussed in 1 McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE,
supra note 14, § 82, at 377.
47. See, e.g., Hicks, 155 S.E.2d at 802 (holding that sur reptitious recording does
not waive the privilege where conversation was otherwise confidential when made);
McCoy v. Justice, 155 S.E. 452, 458 (N.C. 1930) (holding that letters that were confi
dential marital communications were not admissible when obtained by the coopera
tion of one of the marital partners).
48. See Rollins, 658 S.E.2d at 48.
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"attempted to keep their communications from being overheard by
third parties, and succeeded in doing so."49 The court of appeals also
distinguished this case from others in prison settings where the facility
publicized the practice of intercepting certain types of communica
tions and the communications intercepted by prison authorities were
ruled admissible. 50 Here no one intercepted the conversations, and the
Rollins couple did not use a mode of communication, such as tele
phone or mail advertised as subject to interception. 51 There is no indi
cation that the prisons in which the statements were made notified
prisoners or visitors that their conversations in public visiting areas
were subject to voice magnification, monitoring, or recording. In fact,
the court of appeals specifically noted that there was no warning that
Rollins' communications might be monitored in the way they were-by
sur reptitious recording with a device located on his wife.52
C.

The Supreme Court's New Analysis
A four-justice majority of the Supreme Court of North Carolina
questioned none of the foundational facts of the North Carolina Court
of Appeals. But it reached the opposite conclusion, holding that the
conversations were not covered by the marital confidential communi
cations privilege. 53 It did so for reasons no court in North Carolina
had ever given. The court ignored the intent of the speaker to keep the
conversation confidential and the precautions he took to successfully
49. Id. at 49-50.
50. Id. at 48-49 (discussing State v. Gladden, 608 S.E.2d 93, 95-96 (N.C. Ct. App.
2005), where the defendant spoke with family members on an outside line, with the
system giving an automated message that conversations were subject to monitoring
and recording, and the conversation was in fact recorded by authorities).
51. Id. at 49.
52. See id. Before the supreme court's decision in Rollins, such notice of monitor
ing through one's spouse would likely have been ineffectual. There is a relationship
between a "reasonable expectation of privacy" and privilege, but it appears to run in
the opposite direction from what the Supreme Court of North Carolina indicated.
Although not settled in the law, the existence of legal protection through an eviden
tiary privilege may provide a basis in societal values for the expectation of privacy to
be objectively reasonable within the meaning of Katz. See DeMassa v. Nunez, 770 F.2d
1505, 1506-07 (9th Cir. 1985) (concluding that lawyer-client privilege gave defen
dant standing to contest the search of his lawyer's office for client's files); State v.
Howard, 728 A.2d 1178, 1181-84 (Del. Super. Ct. 1998) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy of a married couple was violated when
their conversation in a police station interview room was surreptitiously recorded by
the police in part because the state's wiretap statute exempts from interception and
privilege law protects confidential marital communications).
53. State v. Rollins, 675 S.E.2d 334, 340 (N.C. 2009).
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prevent anyone from overhearing. The privilege did not apply because
it "does not extend to communications occurring in the public visiting
areas of North Carolina [prisons] ...because a reasonable expectation
of privacy does not exist in such areas." 54
The supreme court built its conclusion on two sets of authorities.
First, it cited prior cases, which it asserted depended on the "circum
stances in which the communication takes place, including the physi
cal location and presence of other individuals" to answer the question
of whether the veil of confidence has been removed.55 In the first of
these cases, State v.Freeman, 56 which involved an incriminating state
ment a husband made to his wife in a public parking lot while in the
presence of his wife's brother, the privilege was not upheld. With Free
man, it contrasted two cases, State v. Holmes 57 and Hicks v. Hicks,58
where statements were made in the home and the privilege upheld. In
Holmes, the husband ordered two men from his home before he made
the contested statement to his wife about his intent to kill one of the
men.59 The court noted that in Hicks, the couple's eight-year-old child
54. Id. at 334-35 (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 337.
56. State v. Freeman, 276 S.E.2d 450 (N.C. 1981). The communication in Freeman
was not intended to be confidential irrespective of the place it occurred. The court
described the legal test and the facts of that case as follows:
[T]he question is whether the communication, whatever it contains, was
induced by the marital relationship and prompted by the affection, confi
dence, and loyalty engendered by such relationship. . . . When this definition
is applied to the facts of [this case) . .. , it is apparent that Mrs. Freeman's
proposed testimony included no confidential communication which would
render it incompetent under the rule established in this case. Mrs. Freeman
stipulated that had she been allowed to testify, she would have stated that
defendant parked his car in a public parking lot, approached her and her
brother carrying a shotgun, asked if they wished to speak with him, and
immediately discharged the shotgun, killing Mrs. Freeman's brother. Such
actions in a public place and in the presence of a third person could not have
been a communication made in the confidence of the marital relationship or
one which was induced by affection and loyalty in the marriage. . . . Conse
quently, Mrs. Freeman's testimony is competent and admissible under the
rule adopted in this case.
Id. at 454-55. The encounter described in Freeman-confronting a third party in the
presence of one's wife and speaking to both (shortly before shooting one of them)-is
not confidential under any definition. That determination does not depend on the
place the conversation occurred.
57. State v. Holmes, 412 S.E.2d 660 (N.C. 1992).
58. Hicks v. Hicks, 155 S.E.2d 799 (N.C. 1967).
59. Holmes, 412 S.E.2d at 661.
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was singing or playing in the area. 60 It drew from these contrasting
results the idea that "actual physical privacy, as well as a desire for and
expectation of confidentiality, are important in establishing a confi
dential communication."61
Second, it cited two "legal scholars" for the proposition that "phys
ical privacy is germane to the existence of a confidential communica
tion. "62 The first of these was Edward Imwinkelried, whose treatise on
privilege states:
The situs of the communication is a relevant factor in determining
whether there was the requisite confidentiality at the time of the com
munication. It is possible to have a confidential conversation in a pub
lic place, but the public nature of the situs makes it more difficult to
find the requisite privacy. The layperson must have a reasonable expec
tation of confidentiality. 63

The opinion next cited Robert Mosteller and his coauthors of
North Carolina Evidentiary Foundations for the proposition that "a con
fidential communication requires '(l) physical privacy, and (2) an
intent on the holder's part to maintain secrecy."'64
The supreme court then took a momentous and unfortunate step.
The State had argued that the defendant had no reasonable expecta
tion of privacy under the Fourth Amendment in any area in the prison
facility, citing numerous authorities that clearly establish the accuracy
of that well recognized initial proposition under the federal Constitu
tion.65 The momentous step was the court's agreement with the State's
conclusion from this authority: because there was no Fourth Amend
ment protection, there was also no evidentiary privilege.
The court based its conclusion on the earlier noted authorities, in
addition to a statement by Kenneth S. Broun and his coauthors in
McCormick on Evidence:
60. What inference the majority intended to draw from the presence of the child in
the home and what significance it had are unclear. The opinion can be read to say that
the child was incompetent. Compare Hicks, 155 S.E.2d at 802, with Rollins, 675 S.E.2d
at 341 (Timmons-Goodson, J., dissenting) (arguing for this interpretation). Another
interpretation might be that the child simply was not listening. See Hicks, 155 S.E.2d
at 802. But clearly the Hicks opinion did not consider the child as an unnecessary
third party who destroyed the confidential nature of the conversation.
61. Rollins, 675 S.E.2d at 338.
62. Id.
63. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW W1GMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: EVIDEN
TIARY PRIVILEGES § 6.8.1, at 674 (Richard D. Friedman ed., 2002) (emphasis added).
64. Rollins, 675 S.E.2d at 338 (quoting ROBERT P. MosTELLER ET AL, NORTH CARO·
LINA EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS § 8-2, at 8-6 (2d ed. 2004)).
65. Id. at 338-39.
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The rationale that the spouses may ordinarily take effective measures
to communicate confidentially tends to break down where one or both
are incarcerated. However, communications in the jailhouse are fre
quently held not privileged, often on the theory that no confidentiality
was or could have been expected. 66
These authorities discussed the importance of physical privacy,
used the term "reasonable expectation of confidentiality," and noted
that confidentiality tends to break down in prison situations where
confidentiality is often not expected or possible. However, the authori
ties neither discussed the Fourth Amendment nor endorsed the appli
cation of its "reasonable expectation of privacy" to privilege.
Nevertheless, the supreme court took that step and adopted the con
clusion that the Fourth Amendment's concept of "reasonable expecta
tion of privacy" controlled whether a conversation other wise covered
by the marital confidential communications privilege was protected,
stating: "[C]ommunications occur ring during ordinary [Department
of Cor rections] visits ... do not invoke the protection [the privilege
statute] affords to confidential communications because there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy in such communications." 67 The
loss of privilege was not because the marital partners did not intend to
have a confidential communication, or because such expectation of
confidentiality was not factually reasonable, or even because the
spouses did not take reasonably effective steps to maintain its confi
dentiality. 68 Rather, the statements were not protected by the privilege
66. Id. at 339 (quoting 1 McCORMICK ON EvmENCE, supra note 14, § 82, at 377).
67. Id.
68. After restating its per se legal conclusion that because the conversations
occurred during routine visits at department of corrections facilities the couple
"thereby lacked any reasonable expectation of privacy," the majority in the penulti
mate paragraph of its opinion also suggested the precarious nature of the conversa
tions' confidentiality. Id. at 339-40. It stated that it could be inferred that Mr. Rollins
doubted the privacy of the communication because at one point he checked his wife
for the presence of a recording device. Id. Since the law does not allow the spouse to
destroy the privilege by conniving with others, it would be error for a court to hold
that mere apprehension of such connivance would nevertheless destroy the privilege.
The court also noted that "at times other people were in close proximity and even
spoke to defendant" and his wife during their conversations, but the court never
asserted that anyone overheard or that the couple talked loudly enough to be reasona
bly overheard. Id. The fact that others are nearby should not affect the confidentiality
of the communication if the marital partners took reasonable precautions by speaking
quietly, as they did. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 17, § 5:40, at 753-54.
Finally, the court noted that Mr. Rollins withheld some information until after he
was released from prison. Rollins, 675 S.E.2d at 339-40. The effect of this obser va
tion is that Mr. Rollins was rightfully concerned about confidentiality in a difficult
physical environment, which is consistent with having an intention to maintain confi-
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because the Fourth Amendment's limitation on where the communica
tion takes place does not permit "a reasonable expectation of privacy"
under that constitutional provision in a public visiting area of a
prison.69
The exchange of the word "privacy" for "confidentiality" is a major
change in theory. The precedent that the substitution of words creates
could have an enormous potential impact on the law of privilege. It
would work a profound change in many areas and threaten protection
in others. Although the concepts of confidentiality in privilege law
and the required "reasonable expectation of privacy" under the Fourth
Amendment have some similarity and clearly overlap in some situa
tions, they have heretofore been clearly distinct legal concepts, and
should remain so.
II.

THE CONCEPT OF CONFIDENTIALITY: INTENTION AND
REASONABLE PRECAUTIONS

As noted earlier, the Rollins majority cited three legal scholars and
their treatises for concepts regarding confidentiality in which it pur
ports to find support for adopting the Fourth Amendment's "reasona
ble expectation of privacy" as an element of confidentiality under the
marital confidential communications privilege. 70 It is therefore useful
to examine further case law on which the obser vations in these trea
tises are based. However, it bears noting that the court might have
cited one additional authority. Professors Mueller and Kirkpatrick
make the following statement regarding confidentiality in public
spaces in their treatise, Federal Evidence: "Nor should it matter that a
conversation takes place in the larger presence of others, as might hap
pen on a bus or a plane or a movie theater, ...so long as they took
reasonable precautions to speak in quiet voices or whispers ...." 71
The relevant language from Edward Imwinkelried's treatise on
privilege, using the word "confidentiality" rather than "privacy," is
repeated below:
The situs of the communication is a relevant factor in determining
whether there was the requisite confidentiality at the time of the comdentiality and taking reasonable precautions to maintain it. The court reached no
clear factual conclusion to the contrary nor did it claim North Carolina precedent for
such a finding on this or any other ground.
69. Id. at 339.
70. Id. at 337-39 (citing IMWINKELRIED, supra note 63, § 6.8.1, at 674-75; 1
McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 14, at 377; MOSTELLER ET AL, supra note 64, § 82, at § 8-6).
71. Mt.:ELLER &: KIRKPATRICK, supra note 17, § 5:40, at 753.
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munication. It is possible to have a confidential conversation in a pub
lic place, but the public nature of the situs makes it more difficult to
find the requisite privacy. The layperson must have a reasonable expec
tation of confidentiality. 72

Professor lmwinkelried cites eight cases from state courts with
regard to the need for "a reasonable expectation of confidentiality." 73
These cases involve confidentiality applied to the major evidentiary
privileges that require that concept, not just to the marital confidential
communications privilege. 74 With one exception, which will be dis
cussed in detail, none use the phrase "reasonable expectation of
privacy."75
Gordon v. Boyles, a Colorado civil case, deals with the attorney
client privilege and states "the 'privilege applies only to statements
made in circumstances giving rise to a reasonable expectation that the
statements will be treated as confidential. "' 76 That court focused on the
intention of the party to maintain secrecy and on its precautions not to
disclose the communications to third parties.77 State v. Soto, a Hawaii
criminal case, involved the attorney-client privilege and held there was
no privilege in statements made in the presence of a police informant
who was not part of the defense team, because "there was no reasona
ble expectation of confidentiality in the presence of the informant." 78
State v. List, a New Jersey criminal case involving the clergy-com
municant privilege, held that a letter to the defendant's minister, left
along with directions to contact authorities, "for anyone to find and
read, cannot be considered to have been made with a reasonable expec
tation of confidentiality." 79 Plate v. State, an Alaska criminal case, also
72. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 63, § 6.8.1, at 674 (emphasis added).
73. Id. at 674 n.35.
74. Id.
75. See id.
76. Gordon v. Boyles, 9 P.3d 1106, 1123 (Colo. 2000) (emphasis added) (quoting
Lanari v. People, 827 P.2d 495, 499 (Colo. 1992)).
77. Id.
78. State v. Soto, 933 P.2d 66, 76 (Haw. 1997) (emphasis added). The conversa
tion occurred in a hallway in the courthouse. However, the element that destroyed the
privilege was the known presence of the informant during the conversation and the
clear knowledge that he was an unwelcome intruder who was not part of the defense
team. Id. at 76-78.
79. State v. List, 636 A.2d 1054, 1057 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1993) (emphasis
added). The case also involved a Fourth Amendment claim against admitting this doc
ument and others that were found when the police entered a home where the defen
dant had killed five members of his family. Id. at 1056-58. Along with a note to the
finder to contact authorities and with directions to keys to open the cabinets, the docu
ment was found by police in a file cabinet. Id. at 1057. The court resolved the Fourth
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involved application of the clergy-communicant privilege, which
turned on whether the conversation lacked "a reasonable expectation
of confidentiality."80 However, the appellate court could not resolve
the issue because the trial judge, who could have concluded that the
defendant "had no subjective expectation of confidentiality," focused
solely on the intent of the pastor and therefore did not assess the rea
sonableness of the defendant's professed belief in its confidentiality.81
In State v. Martin, the Washington Court of Appeals reviewed an order
of contempt against a minister for refusing to provide testimony in a
criminal case. 82 The court stated that the clergy-communicant privi
lege depended on the confidentiality of the communication, which
"turns on the communicant's reasonable belief that the conversation
would remain private" and "upon communicant's reasonable expecta
tions of confidentiality. "83
In State ex rel. Joy P. v.Joseph P., a civil parental rights termina
tion case involving the admission of statements to a prison psychiatrist
notwithstanding the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals stated that the patient, inter alia, "must show that he
had an 'objectively reasonable' belief that the discussions were 'confiden
tial' ...."84 The court rejected the prosecution's argument that incar
cerated persons who were evaluated during incarceration had no
psychotherapist-patient privilege, and ruled that indeed the conversa
tion was privileged against being used in the criminal proceeding even
though the psychiatrist informed the patient that it would be shared
Amendment claim against the defendant on the grounds of abandonment and inevita
ble discovery. See id. It did not make reference to that decision in its holding on
privilege. Id. at 1056-58.
80. Plate v. State, 925 P.2d 1057, 1066 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
81. Id. at 1066-67 (emphasis added). The court stated that "(t]he person consult
ing a clergyman must believe that the conversation is to remain private,and the per
son's belief in the privacy of the conversation must be reasonable." Id. at 1066. The
pastor testified· that he either gave the defendant no guarantee of confidentiality or at
most a conditional promise, with the predicate condition to confidentiality unsatisfied.
Id. Because of the way the trial court made its findings, the appellate court, inter alia,
could not resolve whether the pastor's view of the lack of confidentiality was conveyed
to the defendant and, if so, how it affected the defendant's professed belief in confiden
tiality. See id. at 1065-67.
82. State v. Martin, 959 P.2d 152 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).
83. Id. at 159 (emphasis added) (citing Plate, 925 P.2d at 1066; Nicholson v. Wit
tig, 832 S.W.2d 681,685 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992)). The question in the case was whether
others were present when the communications were made, which would void the privi
lege, but the question could not be resolved on the record before the court. Id.
84. State ex rel. Joy P. v. Joseph P., 546 N.W.2d 494, 498 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996)
(emphasis added).
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with her colleagues and used for his treatment while he was in the
prison system.85 State v.Locke, a Wisconsin criminal case also involv
ing the psychotherapist-patient privilege, stated that not only must the
patient believe the discussions were "confidential "but that belief must
have been "objectively reasonable."86
People v. Mickey, a California criminal case, involved the marital
confidential communications privilege and letters from a defendant
incarcerated in Japan at the time the letters were written, which were
sent to his wife in the United States.87 The letters were turned over to
authorities in America and admitted at his trial.88 The court stated
that the "record establishes that the documents were not written or
sent 'in confidence."'89 It did, however, state that "[t]o make a commu
nication 'in confidence,' one must intend nondisclosure ... and have
a reasonable expectation of privacy." 90
The court in Mickey, however, was not ruling as a matter of law.
Instead, it concluded that the defendant appeared not to have the
required intent and certainly did not have the necessary expectation.91
Indeed, it stated he "had no expectation of privacy, reasonable or oth
er wise."29 This is because he believed his letters were being inter
cepted and read by authorities in Japan or the United States.39 Indeed,
he even directed comments in the letters explicitly to such "readers. "94
The court made no reference to the Fourth Amendment nor did it indi85. Id.
86. State v. Locke, 502 N.W.2d 891, 897-98 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
87. People v. Mickey, 818 P.2d 84 (Cal. 1991). The result in Mickey is consistent
with other cases that conclude that confidentiality cannot even be subjectively
intended and is certainly not reasonable when public notice has been given or com
mon knowledge exists of the government's interception of specified types of communi
cation. For example, in Commonwealth v. May, the wife of an incarcerated defendant
testified to the content of the letter she received from her husband indicating that he
had "hurt a girl and buried her in the woods." 656 A.2d 1335, 1339 (Pa. 1995). The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the marital confidential communications
privilege did not protect the letter because the defendant, when incarcerated, had
signed a form permitting prison officials to review all his incoming and outgoing mail.
Id. at 1342. Based on this agreement, the court concluded that he "had no reasonable
expectation that his communications to his wife would be held confidential." Id.
Compare this with the result reached in United States v. Madoch, 149 F.3d 596 (7th
Cir. 1998), discussed supra note 7.
88. Mickey, 818 P.2d at 101-02.
89. Id. at 102.
90. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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cate it was using the term "reasonable expectation of privacy" as a
term of art related to that doctrine.95
Imwinkelried's quotation also indicates that "[t]he situs of the
communication is a relevant factor in determining whether there was
the requisite confidentiality ...." 96 He cites Scott v. Hammock, 97 a
Utah civil case, for this proposition. The Hammock Court was using
location, not because it did not have Fourth Amendment protection,
but as a proxy for the speaker's intent.98 The court stated that
"[w]hether communications between a cleric and a parishioner are
confidential may depend on the facts and circumstances surrounding
the communications, such as whether the situs of the communication
indicates an intent that the communication be confidential ...."99
Professor Mosteller cites five North Carolina cases relating to the
scope of the marital privilege.100 Three of them, Freeman, Holmes, and
Hicks, are described above in the discussion of the supreme court's
opinion in Rollins. 101 Mosteller also discusses State v. Murvin, which
involved the attorney-client privilege, to develop the point that, while
Hicks ruled that the presence of an eight-year-old child did not destroy
confidentiality, the presence of unnecessary family members generally
will do so.102 Also, State v.McQueen holds that even as to oral state
ments made to a spouse in private, the privilege exists only if they were
95. lmwinkelried cites the treatise on attorney-client privilege by Professor Paul
Rice. See lMWINKELRIED, supra note 63, § 6.8.1, at 674 n.35. Rice also writes about the
need for objective evidence both of the client's intent for the communication to be
confidential and that the "confidentiality could reasonably have been anticipated." 1
PAUL R. R1cE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT Pmv1LEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 6:6, at 6-39 (2d ed.
2009). He concludes that a conversation between a prisoner and a lawyer over a tele
phone the prisoner knows is being monitored is without a reasonable expectation of
confidentiality and is the equivalent of having a third party present. Id.§ 6:7, at 6-52,
6-55.
96. lMWJNKELRIED, supra note 63, § 6.8.1, at 674.
97. Scott v. Hammock, 870 P.2d 947 (Utah 1994).
98. Id. at 955.
99. Id. Similarly, with regard to whether the conversation was causal in nature or
intended to be part of a covered communication about moral matters, the court stated:
"[S]tatements made to a cleric in a social context are not privileged because the state
ments are not made to the cleric in the course of his or her professional responsibili
ties or in a religious context." Id.
100. See MOSTELLER ET AL., supra note 64, § 8-2, at 8-6.
101. See supra discussion accompanying notes 56-61.
102. MOSTELLER ET AL., supra note 64, § 8-2, at § 8-6 (addressing State v. Mur vin,
284 S.E.2d 289, 294 (N.C. 1981) (holding, despite Hicks v. Hicks, 155 S.E.2d 799, 802
(N.C. 1967), that the presence of an aunt and a friend when the communication was
made to the lawyer voided the privilege where the presence of these two individuals
was not necessary to protect the interest of the client)).
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made relying on marital privacy. 103 None of these cases indicate any
special need for physical privacy beyond the ordinary reasonable
efforts to prevent unnecessary third parties from overhearing the state
ments, and none of these North Carolina precedents discuss in any
fashion a need for the Fourth Amendment's "reasonable expectation of
privacy."
The statement from Professor Broun in the McCormick treatise is
as follows:
The rationale that the spouses may ordinarily take effective measures
to communicate confidentially tends to break down where one or both
are incarcerated. However, communications in the jailhouse are fre
quently held not privileged, often on the theory that no confidentiality
was or could have been expected. 104

Broun cites four cases in connection with this statement, two support
ing it and two others indicating qualifications.
People v. Von Villas 105 and State v. Smyth 106 are cited in support.
Von Villas allowed admission of a tape-recorded conversation between
a husband and wife while the husband was incarcerated. 107 The court
quoted the test from People v. Mickey, discussed earlier, 108 that "[t]o
make a marital communication 'in confidence,' one must intend non
disclosure and have a reasonable expectation of privacy." 109 The case
was easily resolved on the facts and did not turn on a Fourth Amend
ment determination. The couple was speaking loudly to each other
through the Plexiglas partition separating them with knowledge that a
guard was nearby observing them and therefore failed both aspects of
the test, their conduct indicating no expectation of privacy or confi
dentiality during the conversation and demonstrating they did not
intend nondisclosure.U 0 An earlier, separate section of the opinion in
103. State v. McQueen, 377 S.E.2d 38, 49 (N.C. 1989) (holding that a threat to do
physical harm to a spouse was not privileged because it was not based on confidence
engendered by the marriage). Two other cases, State v. McLemore, 470 S.E.2d 2, 6
(N.C. 1996), and State v. McIntosh, 444 S.E.2d 438, 441-42 (N.C. 1994), address the
point that if the information was intended to be transmitted to others, it is not
confidential.
104. 1 McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 14, § 82, at 377.
105. People v. Von Villas, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 112 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
106. State v. Smyth, 499 P.2d 63 (Wash. Ct. App. 1972).
107. Von Villas, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 135.
108. See supra notes 87 -95 and accompanying text.
109. Von Villas, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 138 (quoting People v. Mickey, 818 P.2d 84, 102
(Cal. 1991)).
110. Id. The conversation was recorded on electronic equipment installed for this
case. Id. at 132. The conversation was loud because the telephone system was not

2010]

STATE V.

ROLLINS: A DANGEROUS MISMATCH

169

Von V illas explicitly held there was no Fourth Amendment protection
for the conversation because of the lack of protection in prison
space.111 In its treatment of the privilege issue, the court made no
reference to that earlier determination.112 Smyth, meanwhile, permit
ted the admission of the contents of a letter written by the defendant to
his wife while in prison.113 The Washington Court of Appeals held
that the contents of that letter were not protected by the marital confi
dential communications privilege because a letter "cannot be intended
to be, nor is it, in fact, a confidential communication" given that the
"[ d]efendant admitted that he knew all outgoing mail from the jail was
read before it was sent out."114
With these cases, Broun suggests comparing two others: Ward v.
State 115 and North v. Superior Court. 116 Ward involves a letter written
by an incarcerated husband that a witness saw him slip to his wife
during a visit, which was taken from her when she departed.117 The
Arkansas Court of Appeals held that the part of the letter addressed to
the wife was privileged under the marital confidential communication
privilege but the part of the letter written to a witness, apparently
directing his perjury was not privileged.118
North is the case that provides the most support for the Supreme
Court of North Carolina's opinion in Rollins. The result in North is
itself of no support, but some of the opinion's language indirectly
might be. In that case, the marital couple visited while the husband
was in jail.119 The meeting took place in the same building as the jail,
in a detective's office with the door shut.120 It was secretly monitored
and recorded.121 The court concluded that because of the location of
the visit, marital privacy could be reasonably expected to exist and
that the reasonable expectation of privacy under the Constitution had
working at the time of the visit. Id. The amplifier had inadvertently been turned off,
perhaps as a result of the installation of the recording device. Id.
111. Id. at 133-35.
112. See id. at 138.
113. State v. Smyth, 499 P.2d 63, 65 (Wash. Ct. App. 1972).
114. Id. at 66.
115. Ward v. State, 66 S.W . 926 (Ark. 1902).
116. North v. Superior Court, 502 P.2d 1305 (Cal. 1972).
117. Ward, 66 S.W. at 927.
118. Id.
119. North, 502 P.2d at 1306-07.
120. Id. at 1307.
121. Id.

170

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:147

been violated. 122 It excluded the evidence as a matter of constitutional
law. 123 That holding did link the Fourth Amendment concept of "rea
sonable expectation of privacy" and the confidentiality concept under
privilege law, but it did so where the reassuring actions of the detective
in providing an apparently private location for the conversation meant
that both the constitutional expectation of privacy and the confidenti
ality of the marital communication existed.
The North opinion also stated that because "an inmate of a jail or
prison has no reasonable expectation of privacy, it would follow that
an ordinary jailhouse conversation between spouses could not be
deemed to have been 'made in confidence,' as required by [California]
Evidence Code section 980 to establish the privilege." 124 However, the
court apparently used this proposition as a factual rather than a legal
test, treating it the same as the fact that a conversation is made under
circumstances where others can overhear, which it considered "'a
strong indication that the communication was not intended to be con
fidential and is, therefore, unprivileged."' 125
Ill.

THE OVERLAP AND DISCORD BETWEEN THE FOURTH AMENDMENT'S
REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY AND THE CONFIDENTIALITY
REQUIRED BY EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES

A.

Theoretical Correspondence and Mismatch

The concept of "reasonable expectation of privacy" under the
Fourth Amendment is traced from the decision in Katz v. United
States. 126 The majority opinion was written by Justice Stewart, 127 but
122. Id. at 1312. The California Supreme Court reached this conclusion despite
testimony by the detective that allowing marital couples to meet in this space was "a
frequent and normal practice," id. at 1307, and without the indication of any explicit
promises of confidentiality in the meeting. The court focused not on the general lack
of "reasonable expectation of privacy" in prison space, but on its limited view that the
need for interception of communications must relate to the need to maintain jail secur
ity; here, the monitoring was instead "done ...for the sole purpose of gathering possi
bly incriminating evidence " which the court believed constituted an "unreasonable
governmental intrusion." Id. at 1312.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1311.
125. Id. (quoting CAL. Evm. CoDE § 917 cmt. (West 2009)).
126. Katz v. United States,389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding unconstitutional the war
rantless recording of conversation inside telephone booth by device located on top, but
outside the booth).
127. Stewart did pen some memorable phrases, including "the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places." Id. at 351. Stewart's statement, "[b]ut the protection of a
person's general right to privacy-his right to be let alone by other people-is, like the
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it is the concurring opinion of Justice Harlan that is most frequently
quoted and provides the starting point for modern analysis. Harlan
stated: "[T]he rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there
is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation
be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."' 128
Legal authorities find three components in this test for coverage
by the Fourth Amendment's "reasonable expectation of privacy."
First, the party must have a subjective expectation of privacy.129 As
Harlan explained, "objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to
the 'plain view' of outsiders are not 'protected' because no intention to
keep them to himself has been exhibited."130 Second, one must also
take objectively reasonable efforts to maintain the privacy of the item
or information. 131
To this point, the requirements of the Fourth Amendment's "rea
sonable expectation of privacy" and the requirement of confidentiality
under evidentiary privileges rather closely align. These components
an intent to keep the information confidential and reasonable efforts
to maintain its confidentiality-are required elements of both. But the
Fourth Amendment has an additional requirement-the expectation
must be one that society is prepared to recognize as objectively reason
able.132 Such a determination is often made by reference to the Fourth

protection of his property and of his very life, left largely to the law of the individual
States," id. at 350-51, recognizes that the place for other protections of privacy, such
as privilege, rests outside the Fourth Amendment.
128. Id. at 361 (Harlan,]., concurring).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 341 (Breyer,]., dissenting) ("(l]t is not
objectively reasonable to expect privacy if '[a]ny member of the public . . . could have'
used his senses to detect 'everything that th[e] officers observed,"' (quoting California
v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986))); cf. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35,
39-40 (1988) (finding lack of reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage left at the
curb in plastic bags because of the lack of objectively reasonable efforts to protect
privacy in the known possibility of exposure to the public as a result of the action of
animals, children, scavengers, or snoops).
132. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
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Amendment's text and/or history; 133 it sometimes is controlled by ref
erence to societal values. 134
Thus, subjective expectation of privacy and objectively reasonable
efforts to maintain that privacy are necessary components of the
Fourth Amendment's "reasonable expectation of privacy," 135 but they
133. An open field, no matter how distant from civilization, and a wilderness forest
have no protection under the Fourth Amendment because they are not included
among the protected elements of the Fourth Amendment's language or history. "[T]he
special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their 'persons,
houses, papers, and effects,' is not extended to the open fields. The distinction
between the latter and the house is as old as the common law." Oliver v. United States,
466 U.S. 170, 176 (1984) (quoting Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924)).
The clear impact of history can be seen in United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294
(1987). In Dunn, the United States Supreme Court held that the defendant had no
"reasonable expectation of privacy" relying on the historical concept of curtilage and
determining that the law enforcement personnel were outside the curtilage because of
the distance from the house and the configuration of the fences. Id. at 300-02. The
Court stated:
The curtilage concept originated at common law to extend to the area
immediately surrounding a dwelling house the same protection under the
law of burglary as was afforded the house itself. The concept plays a part,
however, in interpreting the reach of the Fourth Amendment. Hester v. United
States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924), held that the Fourth Amendment's protection
accorded "persons, houses, papers, and effects" did not extend to the open
fields, the Court observing that the distinction between a person's house and
open fields "is as old as the common law."
Dunn, 480 U.S. at 300. The Court then examined Blackstone's Commentaries for
ancient English history, which it considered important in determining Dunn's twenti
eth century constitutional rights:
In defining the terms "mansion or dwelling house," Blackstone wrote that "no
distant barn, warehouse, or the like are under the same privileges, nor looked
upon as a man's castle of defence. . .." Blackstone obser ved, however, that "if
the barn, stable, or warehouse, be parcel of the mansion-house, and within
the same common fence, though not under the same roof or contiguous, a
burglary may be committed therein; for the capital house protects and privi
leges all its branches and appurtenances, if within the curtilage or
homestall."
Id. at 300 n.3 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *225).
134. See, e.g., Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 129 (2006) (using widely-shared
societal values to determine that one spouse could not consent to a search of the com
monly shared home when the other spouse is present and objects to the search).
135. In his highly regarded treatise, Professor Wayne Lafave analyzes the "reasona
ble expectation of privacy" to involve the separate requirement of the subjective effort
of the individual not to expose the information to the public. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
SEARCH & SEIZURE§ 2.l(c), at 438 (4th ed. 2004). As to an expectation that society is
prepared to accept as reasonable, he notes that some have argued that it anticipates an
objective inquiry-something along the lines of "actions or objects which the law's
hypothetical man would expect to be private" -but that is erroneous and insufficient.
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are not sufficient. This is where the Fourth Amendment and privilege
concepts diverge. For courts other than the Supreme Court of North
Carolina in Rollins, satisfying the subjective expectation of confidential
and taking reasonably effective (objective) efforts to maintain that con
fidentiality are not only necessary, but they are also sufficient. Policy
and values also limit the application of privileges, such as the loss of
privilege for many statements when the confidential communications
are made to facilitate commission of a future crime, 136 but these con
cepts do not rest on privacy limitation.
B.

Practical Mismatch in Categorical Non-Protection for Conversations
and Places
1.

No Expectation of Privacy in a Recorded Conversation with a
Willing Government Witness Even in the Home

In Rollins, the Supreme Court of North Carolina ruled that the
marital confidential communications privilege was void as to the RolId. § 2.l(d), at 439-40. He contends that what is required on this second dimension
is not a high probability of remaining confidential but rather satisfaction of a set of
value judgments that should involve some balance between the nature of the practice
and its impact on the individual's sense of security against its utility as a law enforce
ment technique. Id. at 440-43. However, Lafave admits that decided Supreme Court
cases often fail to adhere to this process and interpret privacy more as a fact than the
constitutional value the Katz analysis should entail. Id. at 443-44.
136. The "crime-fraud" exception to privilege exists in some jurisdictions for many
privileges. It is universally held as an exception to the attorney-client privilege. See 1
McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 14, § 95, at 429 ("[l]t is settled under modern
authority that the privilege does not extend to communications between attorney and
client where the client's purpose is furtherance of a future intended crime or fraud.").
A similar exception also exists in many jurisdictions applied to marital confidential
communications. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 17 § 5:40, at 758-59
(describing "joint participation exception" for the marital confidential communica
tions privilege); STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL
§ 501.02(08], at 501-78 to -79 (9th ed. 2006) (describing the exception as applying to
communications made in order to facilitate crime but not to all joint participation
situations). The North Carolina courts have not ruled on the existence of such an
exception. See 1 BRANDIS & BROIJN, supra note 45, § 127, at 422 (not listing this excep
tion for the marital confidential communications privilege).
Professor Story proposes a different type of policy-based limitation that would
eliminate the protection of privilege to e-mail communications under the marital confi
dential communication privilege as distinct from privileges applied to professional
communications. Story, supra note 11, at 304-16. She makes this argument on the
basis of a different rationale justifying the marital privilege. Id. Her arguments about
the proper shape of privilege law assume that the Fourth Amendment's failure to pro
tect such communications does not affect the varied treatment that privilege policy
should dictate.
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lins couple's conversation in the prison because Mr. Rollins lacked a
reasonable expectation of privacy there. 137 If the test for privilege were
whether Mr. Rollins had a "reasonable expectation of confidentiality"
in a conversation with another person who is a willing government
witness and is wearing an electronic recording or broadcasting device
to provide the conversation to law enforcement authorities, the major
ity did not need to depend on the prison setting. Under the Fourth
Amendment, there is no "reasonable expectation of privacy" in any
conversation with another person who discloses it to authorities
because of a concept of "misplaced confidences," which the United
States Supreme Court noted is part of the human condition. 138
Katz was correctly seen as a paradigm shift in Fourth Amendment
law, 139 and its willingness to leave pure property and trespass con
cepts to one side in appropriate situations caused many to expect enor
mous changes in prior decisions. One of those areas involved
conversations in private places with individuals who unknown to the
speaker were cooperating then, or would later cooperate, with the gov
ernment to reveal secrets learned in private.
In United States v. White, the United States Supreme Court stated
in categorical terms that as far as the Fourth Amendment is con
cerned, the Katz decision changed nothing in terms of how the "rea
sonable expectation of privacy" applied to the misplaced confidence
that one's confidant would not reveal the communication to authori
ties.140 The result was the same for information communicated from
memory or transmitted electronically by another individual to whom
the defendant voluntarily divulged secrets; there is no constitutional
protection.141
The White Court stated:
The Court of Appeals understood Katz to render inadmissible
against White the agents' testimony concerning conversations that
Jackson broadcast to them. We cannot agree. Katz involved no revela
tion to the Government by a party to conversations with the defendant
nor did the court indicate in any way that a defendant has a justifiable
137. State v. Rollins, 675 S.E.2d 334, 334-35 (N.C. 2009).
138. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293,303 (1966) ('"The risk of being over
heard by an eavesdropper or betrayed by an informer or deceived as to the identity of
one with whom one deals is probably inherent in the conditions of human society. It
is the kind of risk we necessarily assume whenever we speak."' (quoting Lopez v.
United States, 373 U.S. 427, 465 (1963) (Brennan, J. dissenting))).
139. See LAFAVE, supra note 135, § 2.l(b), at 435 (agreeing with a description of
Katz as representing a "watershed" event in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
140. United States v. White,401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971).
141. Id. at 753.
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and constitutionally protected expectation that a person with whom he
is conversing will not then or later reveal the conversation to the police.
Hoffa v. United States, which was left undisturbed by [Katz], held
that however strongly a defendant may trust an apparent colleague, his
expectations in this respect are not protected by the Fourth Amend
ment when it turns out that the colleague is a government agent regu
larly communicating with the authorities. . . . [T]hat amendment af
fords no protection to "a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to
whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it." .. ..
If the conduct and revelations of an agent operating without elec
tronic equipment do not invade the defendant's constitutionally justifi
able expectations of privacy, neither does a simultaneous recording of
the same conversations made by the agent or by others from transmis
sions received from the agent to whom the defendant is talking and
whose trustworthiness the defendant necessarily risks.
Our problem is not what the privacy expectations of particular
defendants in particular situations may be or the extent to which they
may in fact have relied on the discretion of their companions. .. . Our
problem, in terms of the principles announced in [Katz), is what
expectations of privacy are constitutionally "justifiable" -what expec
tations the Fourth Amendment will protect in the absence of a
war rant. 14 2
In United States v. Miller, 143 the Court made an e ven more directly
relevant obser vation . It stated:
This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not
prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and con
veyed by him to Gover nment authorities, even if the information is
revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited pur
pose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be
betrayed. 144
Privilege law works differently. Privacy can be shared with appro
priate parties. As a matter of privilege law, not Fourth Amendment
142. Id. at 749-52 (citations omitted) (discussing Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302). The
court of appeals had concluded in White that Katz had effectively overruled On Lee v.
United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952), a pre-Katz decision that had held conversations
with an informer unprotected by the Fourth Amendment. White, 401 U.S. at 747. The
Supreme Court acknowledged that its rationale in On Lee that the informer had not
trespassed when he entered the defendant's premises and conversed with him and
therefore the Fourth Amendment was not violated did not survive Katz. Id. at 750.
However, the On Lee decision rested on a second and independent ground that did
sur vive: the defendant "was talking confidentially and indiscreetly with one he trusted,
and he was overheard." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
143. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
144. Id. at 443.
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doctrine, a spouse may not reveal a confidential communication in tes
timony.145 A separate body of law-confidentiality principles devel
oped under privilege law-protects what the Fourth Amendment's
"reasonable expectation of privacy" does not. If Fourth Amendment
doctrine were to control, no privilege would exist because the follow
ing t wo factors would be decisive: ( 1) the will of the other party in
choosing to reveal the communication and (2) the fact the conversa
tion occurred in prison. Under either or both, the conversation lacks
protection. Privilege case law consistently has ignored the fact that the
Fourth Amendment recognizes no expectation of privacy when a party
to the conversation chooses to reveal it.146 As to conversations in pris
ons, the case law holds that an evidentiary privilege exists unless con
fidentiality was absent under the specific circumstances of the
communication.147
2.

No Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in "Open Fields"
Regardless of Every Precaution to Maintain Confidentiality

Another type of case, indeed a physical area, where Katz' relaxa
tion of traditional property concepts might have been expected to
make changes involved the historically excepted area of the "open
145. The United States Supreme Court recognizes that privilege law and its applica
tion and waivers operate separately from Fourth Amendment expectations of privacy.
See, e.g., Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 133 (2006) (describing the operation of
the federal spousal immunity privilege that permits the wife to describe illegal activi
ties conducted by the husband in the home even if the Fourth Amendment bars police
entry when the husband objects to his wife granting consent to the search).
146. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text (discussing the generally
accepted position in privilege law that a spouse cannot unilaterally waive the privilege
by disclosing the confidential communication, by secret recording of the conversation,
or by otherwise conniving with a third party to arrange hidden third-party overhearing
of the communication).
147. See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text (discussing result in the DeFonte
case that rejects linking the loss of a "reasonable expectation of privacy" under the
Fourth Amendment as to prisoner property in a prison cell and the elimination of
confidentiality under the attorney-client privilege); notes 84-95 and accompanying
text (discussing two state-court cases that involve an independent showing for loss of
confidentiality); notes 105-25 and accompanying text (citing four additional cases
with only one, North, even arguably supporting the Supreme Court of North Carolina's
rationale but doing so in the context of finding the communication protected by both
the Fourth Amendment and privilege); note 7 (discussing numerous cases where com
munication on a monitored telephone or similar situation in prison was viewed as
outside the protection of privilege because the communication lacked confidentiality,
generally relying on explicit notice that such communications are subject to official
monitoring and not automatically applying of the Fourth Amendment's treatment of
prison space as largely lacking a "reasonable expectation of privacy").
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field." Early in the twentieth century, the United States Supreme
Court ruled that "open fields," which are areas outside the home, its
curtilage, and other buildings, but need be neither open nor a field,
were not protected by the Fourth Amendment.1 4 8 In United States v.
Hester, Justice Holmes stated: "[T]he special protection accorded by
the Fourth Amendment to the people in their 'persons, houses, papers,
and effects,' is not extended to the open fields. The distinction
between the latter and the house is as old as the common law."' 149
In 1984, the Supreme Court examined whether that holding survived the change made in Fourth Amendment law by Katz' adoption of
the "reasonable expectation of privacy" concept. Two cases were
decided under the caption of Oliver v. United States.'5 ° In defendant
Oliver's case, the Kentucky State Police encountered a locked gate on a
farm and went around it.' 5 ' They observed No Trespassing signs
posted at regular intervals and were verbally warned that hunting was
not allowed. 152 In the companion case, Maine police officers walked
15 3
into a secluded wooded area along a path.
The Court ruled that, despite the isolation of the areas searched,
there was no "reasonable expectation of privacy.'1' 54 It stated:
The Amendment does not protect the merely subjective expectation of
privacy, but only those "expectation[s] that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."'
No single factor determines whether an individual legitimately
may claim under the Fourth Amendment that a place should be free of
government intrusion not authorized by warrant. In assessing the
degree to which a search infringes upon individual privacy, the Court
has given weight to such factors as the intention of the Framers of the
Fourth Amendment, the uses to which the individual has put a location, and our societal understanding that certain areas deserve the
most scrupulous protection from government invasion. These factors
are equally relevant to determining whether the government's intrusion
upon open fields without a warrant or probable cause violates reasonable expectations
of privacy and is therefore a search proscribed by the
55
Amendment. 1

148. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).
149. Id. at 59.
150. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (deciding the cases of Oliver v.
United States from Kentucky and Maine v. Thornton from Maine).
151. Id. at 173.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 174.
154. Id. at 182-83.
155. Id. at 177-78 (citations omitted).
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The Court similarly ruled there was no reasonable expectation of
privacy in United States v. Dunn, 156 for observations made on the
defendant's almost 200-acre ranch that was completely surrounded by
an exterior fence and also had numerous interior barbed wire fences,
where the agents crossed over the exterior fence and two interior
fences to make the observations.157
Despite some major changes that Katz created in the way Fourth
Amendment coverage is conceived, and its certain move away from his
torically narrow concepts of property and physical trespass, the
dimensions of the Fourth Amendment's protections have remained
largely tethered to a conception of property.158 As the Court stated in
Minnesota v. Olson, "[s]ince the decision in Katz ... , it has been the
law that 'capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment
depends ...upon whether the person who claims the protection of the
Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded
place."' 159 By contrast, privilege law contains no such property-based
limitation.
IV.

WHY THE MISTAKE OF ADOPTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT'S
"REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY" AS

pART

OF THE

CONFIDENTIALITY TEST MATTERS

There are a number of reasons for concern about the impact of a
holding that the confidential nature of privileged communications is
lost if a party to the communication lacks Fourth Amendment protec
tion because he or she lacks a "reasonable expectation of privacy."
Important process issues, albeit not the most serious problems with
the Rollins holding, afflict this decision. Rollins confuses the law 160
and potentially cedes aspects of what has previously been a matter of
state law and careful nuance to the single voice of the United States
156. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987).
157. Id. at 297-98, 300-03 (finding that the observations were made outside the
home's curtilage).
158. See discussion of continued effects of property law analysis on the treatment of
modern forms of electronic communication in infra Part IV.B., which follows
immediately.
159. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 95 (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,
143 (1978)).
160. As noted earlier, supra note 10, the dissent in Rollins particularly bemoans the
greater uncertainty that the majority's adoption of the Fourth Amendment standard
brings to privilege law, stating that introducing this concept of the Fourth Amendment
"serves only to muddy the already murky waters of our law of confidential communi
cations." See State v. Rollins, 675 S.E.2d 334, 341 (N.C. 2009) (Timmons-Goodson,].,
dissenting).
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Supreme Court, which often decides Fourth Amendment issues in the
shadow of important police practices to control crime and security
efforts to thwart terrorism. A second and more important reason for
concern can be found in the handling of eavesdroppers, whether pri
vate snoops under privilege law or public investigations under the
Fourth Amendment. The lenient treatment of the latter in part flows
from the stunning inability of the Fourth Amendment to deal compre
hensively and effectively with the technological changes that are part
of the communications revolution in the digital age and the types of
third party interactions we depend upon to live our modern lives and
communicate messages and information.
A.

Confusion in the Law of Privilege and Loss of State Control

Rollins deals with prisoners who lack "a reasonable expectation of
privacy" in not only their communications, but also their effects while
in the close confinement of prisons. The majority states that the pris
oner cannot, for that reason, have a privileged conversation with his or
her spouse even when the prisoner satisfies the independent require
ments of confidentiality, both in terms of his or her subjective intent to
maintain confidentiality in the communications and by taking reason
able precautions to protect it from being overheard by others. 161 The
same reasoning could be applied to deny protection for communica
tions that would come within other privileges under existing case law.
If the prisoner lacks the ability to create a confidential communication
for the marital privilege, which other privileges does the Rollins theory
cover? If the prisoner's conversation with his or her spouse is unique,
why does the Fourth Amendment control in this situation but not
others?
Heretofore, privileges have been variegated in their protections
and nuanced in defining accepted methods of maintaining confidenti
ality that fit with the nature and needs of the privilege. For example,
multiple individuals may handle a communication and it may remain
confidential within the attorney-client privilege although it would be
difficult to contend that allowing such sharing is actually "necessary,"
rather than something closer to customary, reasonable, and efficient.
By contrast, such intermediaries would be viewed as unnecessary and
therefore not permitted for the marital confidential communications
privilege. 162 The "reasonable expectation of privacy" of the Fourth
161. Id. at 339-40.
162. See Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 15-17 (1934) (holding that communi
cation by husband through a letter written with the help of his secretary voided the
privilege because the secretary was not a necessary intermediary); see also Story, supra
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Amendment changes based on circumstances, but it would not gener
ally change between the privileges involved as just described. Instead,
the concept of "one size fits all" would control if the "reasonable expec
tation of privacy" determines confidentiality for privilege purposes.
A second uncertainty is the nature of who makes privilege law
decisions. If the Fourth Amendment is an embedded part of confiden
tiality, then it is the United States Supreme Court that decides a criti
cal part of every privilege, not state supreme courts, which can declare
for criminal cases prosecuted under state law what their own constitu
tion's version of the right to be protected against unreasonable
searches and seizures means, but not the meaning of "reasonable
expectation of privacy" under the federal Fourth Amendment for
which the Supreme Court is the final arbiter. P resumably, the state
legislature or courts, acting in the common law tradition, can and
should determine that Fourth Amendment doctrine does not control
privilege law, but neither can control the interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment if that controls a dimension of the scope of evidentiary
privileges.
B.

An Illustration in the Treatment of "Private" Eavesdroppers
for Privileges and Public Eavesdroppers for the Fourth
Amendment

At the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted, eavesdroppers
who often literally stood in the eaves of houses to listen, were known
nuisances, but they were subject to reasonably effective control by the
cautious communicators who could simply check the surrounding
space. Perhaps because they could be relatively easily thwarted by the
conscientious, in early decisions eavesdroppers were often permitted
to provide testimony regarding the secrets they overheard unless they
operated with the connivance of one of the parties to the privileged
communication. 163 As the technology available to eavesdroppers
note 11, at 296-303 (arguing that differences in history or the marital communica
tions privilege and necessity for third party intermediaries in communication explain
differences between that privilege and privileges applied to communications with pro
fessionals regarding the relatively strict prohibition against the presence of third par
ties in protected marital confidential communication).
163. See 8 W1GMORE, EvmENCE § 2326, at 633-34 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (taking
the position that because means of preserving the privilege was largely in the client's
hands, eavesdroppers should be allowed to testify and even disagreeing that conni
vance of a holder of the privilege should create an exception to this rule of availability
of the eavesdroppers testimony); Commonwealth v. Wakelin, 120 N.E. 209, 212
(Mass. 1918) (standing as an example of the earlier approach where the court
approved admission of testimony by an eavesdropper who monitored marital conversa-
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became more penetrating and difficult to thwart, privilege law gener
ally changed. The modern trend is to prohibit testimony by the eaves
dropper as long as the communicators took "reasonable precautions"
to maintain confidentiality. 164 Thwarting interception by the deter
mined snoop equipped with modern technology may be virtually
impossible, but admission of the intercepted communication can be
denied by privilege law.
The progression of the law under the Fourth Amendment, when it
comes to the "eavesdropping" efforts of law enforcement, has not been
the same as for privilege law. 165 The story is obviously complicated,
but sense enhancement has generally been tolerated for quite under
standable reasons. The controls are not against private snoops intrud
ing into types of communications that society has determined merit
protection. Instead, the Supreme Court has been somewhat reticent to
impose controls that would restrict law enforcement in finding and
tion using "a mechanical contrivance called a dictograph," without the knowledge of
either partner while both were confined).
164. 1 McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 14, § 74, at 346-47; see also 2 WEIN
STEIN & BERGER, EVIDENCE 9l 503(b)[02], at 503-52 (1996) ("While it may perhaps
have been tolerable in Wigmore's day to penalize a client for failing to achieve secrecy,
such a position is outmoded in an era of sophisticated eavesdropping devices against
which no easily available protection exists."); CAL EvID. CoDE § 954 cmt. (West 2009)
("Under Section 954, the lawyer-client privilege can be asserted to prevent anyone
from testifying to a confidential communication. Thus, clients are protected against
the risk of disclosure by eavesdroppers and other wrongful interceptors of confidential
communications between lawyer and client."). Under North Carolina law, the eaves
dropper to a marital communication can testify if the acquisition of the infor mation
was not with the connivance of the other spouse. See 1 BRANDIS & BROUN, supra note
45, § 127, at 421-22.
165. Professor Imwinkelried traces the origin of privilege law to non-instrumental
rationales, which he terms a humanistic justification that prohibits immoral disclo
sures. IMWJNKELRIED, supra note 63, § 2.3, at 105-06. In the modern trend to allow
privileges to bar testimony from eavesdroppers, he notes that privilege law rejected
substantial contrary instrumental arguments and adhered to its earlier humanistic
rationale. See id. § 6.6.3, at 590-93. By contrast, the Fourth Amendment, which is
designed to protect citizens against oppressive governmental power, has more theoreti
cal difficulty recognizing protection against such private betrayals, even if socially
immoral. Perhaps for this reason, the Court in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745
(1971), accepted the position of On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952), and did
not follow the lead of privilege law in allowing exclusion of private betrayals:
"It would be a dubious service to the genuine liberties protected by the
Fourth Amendment to make them bedfellows with spurious liberties impro
vised by farfetched analogies which would liken eavesdropping on a conver
sation, with the connivance of one of the parties, to an unreasonable search
or seizure. We find no violation of the Fourth Amendment here."
Id. at 750 (quoting On Lee, 343 U.S. at 754).
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prosecuting crime, 166 although the Court has drawn the line with the
interception of telephone communications 167 and when the intrusion
is into the home. 168 However, the Court has indicated that enhance
ment techniques, even those peering into the home, may not violate the
Fourth Amendment if the technology is "in general public use. " 169
With the special protection afforded to the home and the contin
ued importance of property concepts under the Fourth Amendment,
the overall approval and allowance of enhanced sur veillance practices,
combined with advances in technology, have eroded the Fourth
Amendment protections in many situations encountered frequently in
modern daily life. Professor Orin Kerr, who writes primarily about
new technology and the Fourth Amendment, is among many who have
reported the inability of the Fourth Amendment's "reasonable expecta
tion of privacy" principle to cope with modern technologyY° Kerr
has persuasively asserted that the cases following Katz demonstrate
not a revolutionary rejection of the linkage between property concepts
and the Fourth Amendment but "have mostly matched the contours of
real property law" 17 1 applied somewhat more flexibly. 1 72 He explains
166. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986) (approving
photographic aerial sur veillance of commercial premises using precision mapping
camera); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S.445 (1989) (approving observations from helicop
ter into greenhouse on residential property).
167. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding unconstitutional the
warrantless recording of conversation inside telephone booth by device located on top,
but outside the booth); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (striking down New
York's wiretapping statute for failure to provide sufficient safeguards but providing
guidelines for developing constitutionally acceptable provisions). See generally Orin S.
Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case
for Caution, 102 M1cH.L.REV.801, 847-50 (2004) (describing the factual differences
between Katz and Berger and the interplay between the Court and Congress in devel
oping a constitutional wiretapping statute).
168. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding thermal scan of
home to be a search because it yields "details of the home that would previously have
been unknowable without physical intrusion"); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705,
715 (1984) (holding beeper monitoring to be a Fourth Amendment search because it
revealed "a critical fact about the interior of [a home] that the Government ... could
not have otherwise obtained without a warrant).
169. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34, 40.
170. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 167; Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L.
REv. 101 (2008).
171. Kerr, supra note 167, at 827.
172. Id. at 818-19 (arguing that "Katz can plausibly be read (and implicitly has
been read by many courts) not as rejecting the existing property view of the Fourth
Amendment, but merely reemphasizing the Court's turn to a looser version of the
property approach first introduced in Uones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960)],"

2010]

STATE V. ROLLINS: A DANGEROUS MISMATCH

183

that new technologies can hide what was previously exposed or reveal
what was previously hidden, and in the latter case, it often reveals the
information without requiring intrusion on protected property inter
ests that would previously have been violated. Because "[n]ew technol
ogies more commonly expose information that in the past would have
remained hidden," technological advances generally have resulted in a
diminishment of Fourth Amendment protections. 173
Professor James Tomkovicz has repeated what is obvious about
the Supreme Court's suggestion that even sense enhancement devices
that reveal information in the home do not violate the Fourth Amend
ment if they are in "general public use"-no one quite knows the mean
ing of that term. 174 However, Professor Tomkovicz uses one set of
meaning for the term and develops its implications as follows:
[W]hen the use of a particular technology is "general," "routine," or
"regular," the details that can be learned through the augmentation of
human faculties are effectively "exposed" to users. Once the use of a
device is known to be (or should be known to be) sufficiently wide
spread, it may be fair to conclude that individuals ... forfeit the pri
vacy interest they would otherwise have in those details. Their
"revelatory conduct" yields public exposure that contradicts the legiti
macy of any assertion of secrecy. 175

He goes on to question whether such diminution in the scope of pri
vacy of constitutional liberties vis-a-vis the government should be toler
ated simply through the march of technology. 176
As important as this general trend has been, the more significant
shift in protection may result from an incompatibility between Fourth
Amendment precedent and the fact that modern digital communica
tion more commonly results in information being shared with, or
accessible to, others and also in such information being "stored" by
others. As noted earlier in White, the reasonable expectation of pri
vacy potentially ends when information is shared with anyone, if the
person receiving it decides to convey the information to authorities. 177
The Court broadened the impact of this threat to privacy in a series of
cases that ruled that, when information is shared with third parties
who are not intimates, they need not be willing to share the informaand describing this looser version as "focused on whether the defendant's presence
was 'legitimate' or 'wrongful'").
173. Kerr, supra note 167, at 827-28.
174. James J. Tomkovicz, Technology and the Threshold of the Fourth Amendment: A
Tale of Two Futures, 72 Miss. L.J. 317, 412 (2002 ).
175. Id. at 412-13.
176. Id. at 413.
177. See discussion supra in Part 111.B.1.
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tion. The expectation of privacy ends upon the transfer, even if the
other party is unwilling to disclose it and if the records were assumed
confidential. 178 These cases are United States v. Miller, 179 Smith v.
Maryland, 180 and California v. Greenwood. 181 As the Court stated in
Miller,
the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information
revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authori
ties, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will
be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the
third party will not be betrayed. 182

Such sharing of information with third parties who transmit, pro
cess, and store information is almost a necessity of life in the modern
world, but it is likely not protected by a "reasonable expectation of
privacy" under the Fourth Amendment. 183 In addition, the defendant
generally lacks the Fourth Amendment right to challenge the govern
ment when it secures information that originates from the defendant,
but in which he or she has no ownership rights, and which the defen
dant does not possess at the time of the seizure. 184 As discussed
below, much modern digital data is of this type.
178. As the Court stated regarding bank records,
[t]he depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the
information will be conveyed by that person to the Government. This Court
has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the
obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to
Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assump
tion that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed
in the third party will not be betrayed.
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (citations omitted). However, the
Court did not rule on the effect of evidentiary privileges that promise confidentiality.
Id. at 443 n.4.
179. Id. at 443 (holding that depositors do not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in bank records despite their assumption to the contrary).
180. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979) (holding that phone callers
have no Fourth Amendment protection in the numbers dialed because they lack a rea
sonable expectation of privacy in them and suggesting that telephone callers do not
have "any general expectation that the numbers they dial will remain secret").
181. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988) (holding, inter alia, that
because the defendant conveyed his trash to garbage collectors for disposal he has no
expectation of privacy as a result of the voluntary transfer).
182. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
183. See generally Peter P. Swire, Katz is Dead, Long Live Katz, 102 MICH. L. REV.
904, 908 (2004) (arguing that Smith and Miller stand for the "broad proposition that
individuals 'voluntarily' reveal information when they give documents or data to third
parties" and thereby lose Fourth Amendment rights).
184. See id. at 909.
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After Berger and Katz, Congress responded in 1967 with the Elec
tronic Sur veillance Control Act, 185 which is commonly referred to as
Title III, where it appears in the Omnibus Crime Control Act of
1968. 186 That legislation generally is understood by the courts to go
at least as far as the Fourth Amendment as to wiretapping and elec
tronic eavesdropping and, in some situations, to surpass the constitu
tional protection. 187 The result is that courts today do not articulate
the dimensions of the Fourth .Amendment in these areas but only dis
cuss the reach of Title III. 188 Indeed, when Congress did not protect
the radio portion of cordless telephone calls, the courts refused to say
whether the Fourth Amendment covered them but deferred to Con
gress's decision not to do so. 189
Congress responded to Miller in 1978 with the Right to Financial
Privacy Act 190 and to Smith in 1986 with the Electronic Communica185. 18 u.s.c. §§ 2510-2522 (2006).
186. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968).
187. As one author explains, the Wiretap Act
has all but supplanted the Fourth Amendment in regulating wiretaps,
because the protections of the Wiretap Act exceed those of the Fourth
Amendment in many circumstances. For example, unlike the Fourth Amend
ment, the Wiretap Act's applicability does not hinge upon a reasonable
expectation of privacy. Furthermore, while the Fourth Amendment only
applies to government officials, the Wiretap Act applies to government offi
cials as well as to private parties. Warrants under the Wiretap Act have cer
tain protections that Fourth Amendment warrants lack, and . . . beyond
requiring probable cause, they require a finding that "normal investigative
procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be
unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous." Only certain high-rank
ing government officials are permitted to apply for warrants under the Wire
tap Act.
Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Kerr's Misguided Call for Judicial
Deference, 74 FoRDHAM L. REv. 747, 754-55 (2005) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c)
(2006)); see also Ric Simmons, Can Winston Save Us from Big Brother? The Need for
Judicial Consistency in Regulating Hyper-Intrusive Searches, 55 RuTGERS L. REv. 547,
560-62 (2003) (noting as to electronic eavesdropping that courts are unanimous in
ruling that Title lII satisfies the requirements of the Fourth Amendment and may
exceed those requirements in some situations and as to video surveillance that Title
lll's statutory scheme is identical to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement).
188. See Kerr, supra note 167, at 850 ("When confronted with claims that wiretap
ping violated the Fourth Amendment, courts typically fall back on the statutory pro
tections of Title lII and go no further.").
189. See id. at 852-53. Such calls were finally protected in 1994. Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414, § 202(a), 108 Stat. 4279
(1994).
190. Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (2006).
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tion Privacy Act. 191 Also, in 1986, Congress addressed the lack of abil
ity to challenge seizure of private information in the possession of
third parties in the Stored Communications Act. 192 These statutes are
not like Title Ill in surpassing protections that would exist if the
Fourth Amendment covered the data. Instead, while some procedural
protections generally are provided, they are substantially inferior to the
requirement of probable cause and the preference for a war rant. 193
Also, the existence of these legislative protections do not mean that the
Fourth Amendment's "reasonable expectation of privacy" protects
such communications and information. Indeed, Congress stepped
into the lurch because the Fourth Amendment had proved inadequate.
Thus, the Supreme Court of North Carolina's holding that confidenti
ality depends on Fourth Amendment recognition of a "reasonable
expectation of privacy" would mean much of the information we
depend on today would lack confidentiality under privilege law as
well.
A few examples are useful. Katz and Berger dealt with the moni
toring or seizure of "in-stream" telephone calls. The seizures occurred
at the moment of communication. Until the past few decades, most
electronic communication was either of this in-stream type, or if it was
recorded, the recording (such as an answering machine message) was
housed in the same location as the recipient of the call. Thus, the com
munication was covered by the protection of Katz and Berger, or it was
frequently protected, if recorded in the location of the mechanical
recording, under the recipient's "reasonable expectation of privacy."
Those temporal and spatial givens are typically no longer accu
rate. As is generally known, neither e-mails nor voice mail messages
are typically stored on the site of the recipient. Instead, they are
housed in ser vers of the service provider. Moreover, many phone calls
cur rently, and an increasingly growing number over time, spend some
brief time stored in ser vers during transmission. As a consequence, it

191. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 2848 (included in codified sections scattered
throughout Title 18 of the U.S. Code).
192. Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (2006). See generally
Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator's Guide
to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1208 (2004).
193. See Swire, supra note 183, at 916. Professor Swire obser ves that only the Pri
vacy Protection Act of 1980-which was enacted after the Supreme Court held that
there was no need for a warrant in the search of a newspaper office for infor mation
about new s sources-provides protections comparable to those offered by a warrant.
Id. at 916-17 (citing Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978)).
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is unclear whether Fourth Amendment protections do or will cover any
of these modern forms of communication. 194
Finally, data stored in modern form is clearly not the tangible
property of the creator of that information; it is not a document writ
ten on the party's letterhead but rather electronic impulses recorded
on hardware typically owned by the storage agent. When information
is stored by a third party, at least absent a privileged relationship
between the party storing the information and the agent, the law does
not recognize the standing of the creator of that information under the
Fourth Amendment to contest a search. 195
CONCLUSION

The "reasonable expectation of privacy" concept of the Fourth
Amendment is constrained by the text of the Constitution, history, and
Supreme Court precedent that responds to numerous factors beyond
subjective intent and objective efforts to protect confidentiality. The
concept of confidentiality for evidentiary privileges shares some com
mon features with the modern formulation of the "reasonable expecta
tion of privacy" in Katz. This requires a subjective intention to keep
the communication confidential, and it requires reasonable efforts to
do so. However, the concept of confidentiality is not burdened with
many of the value judgments and historical accoutrements that the
Fourth Amendment has acquired. For example, it disables the second
member of a confidential marital communication from revealing the
information to the police, while the Fourth Amendment treats that
willingness as by itself destroying the "reasonable expectation of pri
vacy." Confidentiality under privilege law can have the same limits as
194. See Swire, supra note 183, at 910 (arguing that "[u]nder the case law and
emerging facts, there is a surprisingly strong case for believing that Katz and Berger
are no longer good law even for the contents of telephone calls").
195. See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335-36 &: n.19 (1973) (recognizing
no Fourth Amendment "reasonable expectation of privacy" in records in the posses
sion of the accountant and noting that no federal privilege exists for accountants nor
has any state-created accountant privilege been recognized in federal cases). Although
not settled in the law, the existence of legal protection through a privilege may provide
a basis in societal values for the expectation to be objectively reasonable. See DeMassa
v. Nunez, 770 F.2d 1505, 1506-07 (9th Cir. 1985) (concluding that lawyer-client
privilege gave defendant standing to contest the search of his lawyer's office for client's
files); State v. Howard, 728 A.2d 1178, 1181-84 (Del. Super. Ct. 1998) (holding that
the Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy of a married couple was
violated by surreptitious police recording of their hushed conversation in a police sta
tion interview room because of the protection given to marital communications in the
state's wiretap statute and privilege law).
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the Fourth Amendment's "reasonable expectation of privacy," but it is
often broader.
Perhaps in compensation, privilege law has other limitations that
make it narrower than Fourth Amendment protections outside of con
fidentiality. For example, privilege law denies the privilege generally
to conversations for the purpose of committing a crime regardless of
the confidentiality of the communication, while the Fourth Amend
ment clearly applies to such content if its other requirements are met.
Also, privilege law does not generally eliminate use of the information
acquired by a breach of the privilege, only denying admission of the
communication itself, while the Fourth Amendment provides in most
situations protection against any use of information derived from the
constitutional violation.196 These are part of the basic nature of the
separate law of privilege. Additionally, evidentiary privileges have
varied from one another in the general circumstances of communica
tions that are normally understood to be confidential, such as the par
ties that are presumed to be reasonably necessary to the
communication. Such differences take into account the norms of the
differing relationships involved in the various privileges. 197
The critical error in Rollins was holding that, as a matter of law,
the absence of the Fourth Amendment's "reasonable expectation of
privacy" in the place the conversation occurred meant confidentiality
under privilege law was automatically lacking. We may take comfort
that an organized crime figure has no reasonable expectation of pri
vacy under the Fourth Amendment when he speaks in his office to a
hired killer about a planned "hit," his conversation and lip movement
being observed through a window by the sense enhancement of a tele
scope in a distant building and translated by a trained lip reader. Simi
larly, society may be well-ser ved by the fact that the drug dealer who
transacts his business at a park table in the open and surrounded by
his lieutenants is fair game for virtually any type of interception with
out Fourth Amendment protection because he acts in an "open field."
However, conversations under these same physical circumstances,
despite having no Fourth Amendment "reasonable expectation of pri196. See generally Robert P. Mosteller, Admissibility of Fr uits of Breached Evidentiary
Privileges: The Importance of Adversarial Fairness, Party Culpability, and Fear of Immu
nity, 81 WASH. U. LQ. 961 (2003).
197. For example, as noted earlier, communication through a secretary is the norm
and permissible within confidentiality for the attorney-client privilege but not for the
marital confidential communications privilege and would be permissible for the latter
privilege only in exceptional circumstances. See supra note 162 and accompanying
text.
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vacy," should remain privileged under the recognized evidentiary priv
ileges if they concern, not future crime, but legitimate communication
that is intended to be kept confidential because these circumstances
a private conversation in an office or at a secluded park bench-consti
tute reasonable precautions to maintain confidentiality.
The march of technology is perhaps the most important concern
implicated by the error in Rollins. Attorney-client communication by
e-mail, mobile phone, "land line" if carried on the internet in part, and
messages left on cell phone voicemail may or may not have Fourth
Amendment protection because they involve stored data in third-party
hands or because the technology can be intercepted by devices gener
ally available in most well equipped electronics stores. 198 Privilege law
must deal with the ease of interception issue to determine whether the
communication lacks reasonable confidentiality,199 but it should not
be dependent on the United States Sqpreme Court agreeing that
Fourth Amendment protections also exist. If "stored information" is
found to lack Fourth Amendment protection because of the cramped
interpretation of shared privacy under Smith, Miller, and Greenwood,
there is no reason privilege law should even take note. Similarly,
under Greenwood, the police who dig through an individual's trash
may be authorized to use the information discovered, and even the
reassembled strips of a shredded letter may be admissible in the hands
of the police against a Fourth Amendment challenge. 200 However,

198. Professor Daniel Solove argues that the probable impact of Miller and Smith is
that individuals do not have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in communications
and records maintained by internet service providers or computer network administra
tors. See Solove, supra note 12, at 201.
199. See CAL. Evrn. CooE § 917(b) (West 2009) ("A communication between per
sons in a relationship listed in subdivision (a) [including lawyer-client] does not lose
its privileged character f or the sole reason that it is communicated by electronic means
or because persons involved in the delivery, facilitation, or storage of electronic com
munication may have access to the content of the communication."); N.Y.C.P.L.R.
§ 4548 (Consol. 2007) ("No communication privileged under this article shall lose its
privileged character for the sole reason that it is communicated by electronic means or
because persons necessary for the delivery or facilitation of such electronic communi
cation may have access to the content of the communication.").
200. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 975 F.2d 927, 928-31 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding
that the act of shredding documents does not create a reasonable expectation of pri
vacy in documents discarded in the garbage and concluding despite their warrantless
seizure that when successfully reassembled they could be introduced by the
government).
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privilege law need not permit a litigant to admit in evidence that same
document. 2 o '
Rollins creates a legal equivalence between Fourth Amendment
privacy and confidentiality under privilege law that previously did not
exist. That assertion of legal equivalency is erroneous under prior
authorities and precedent. While the treatises may differ on precise
results, one does not find in any of them that privilege law should
simply adopt the results of the Fourth Amendment case law to govern
confidentiality.
Moreover, such a change in the law would be particularly unfortunate if applied outside the specific facts and circumstances of Rollins.
Such application, which the decision does not theoretically limit,
would diminish the limited zones of valuable informational security
that evidentiary privileges help maintain with our marital partners
and in professional relationships in a modern world where freedom
from public scrutiny is an increasingly diminishing and valuable
commodity.

201. Professor Rice states that tearing a document into multiple pieces before disposal should be sufficient to maintain the attorney-client privilege because that act constitutes reasonable efforts to destroy that communication, thereby satisfying the
requirement of the privilege for reasonable expectation of confidentiality. See 1 RICE,
supra note 95, § 6.6, at 6-42.

